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A wife may avoid her contract, extorted by a threatened criminaf
prosecution of her husband, on the ground of duress; and the fact that
after she had signed the contract, the plaintiff gave her the notes forged
by her husband, together with others given by him as security therefor,
to be given to the husband, which she accordingly did, and the notes
were thereupon destroyed by him, does not estop her from avoiding her
note extorted at the time under threats of prosecuting the husband.
DURESS.
I. "Duress, in its more extended sense, means that degree-
of constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened:
and impending, which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehen-
sion, to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary
firmness:" Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205. It does not neces-
sarily imply that the means used should be in themselves un-
lawful, but includes the use of lawful mean's in an unlawful
manner, or for an improper purpose; and, on the other hand,.
even if the means used should be improper, as for instance
the threat of a baseless prosecution, there is no duress, unless
the threat so operated on the mind of the person threatened as-
to deprive him of the free exercise of his will. In some of its
manifestations, duress is hardly to be distinguished from un-
due influence: Lighthall v. Moore, 2 Colo. App. 554; and it
extends not merely to the case of threats, but includes the
I Reported in 59 N. W. Rep. 564.
abuse of one's legal position as owner by title of possession,
in order to force the real owner to admit or satisfy an unjust
claim, of which the unwarranted detention of property by a
pledgee or bailee will serve as an example.
II. Duress at common law was divided into duress by im-
prisonment, and duress fier ininas, or by threats. To these
may be added a third, also recognized by the common law,
but not accorded the dignity of a separate existence,-duress
of goods. This does not seem to belong properly under
either of the preceding divisions; and is now admitted to
form a distinct branch of the law of duress.
III. Duress by imprisonment consists in the use of impri-
sonment, lawful or unlawful, to force the party imprisoned
into executing a contract. If the imprisonment be unlawful,
the circumstances under which the contract is made cannot
clothe it with validity. It makes no difference whether the
overtures for the agreement come from the one party or the
other. The imprisonment being illegal, the contract is equally
so, whether formed at the suggestion of the prosecutor, or at
the request of the defendant: Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H.
508; Osborn v. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365. When, after a person
has procured the arrest of another on a criminal charge, which
'did not justify his arrest, and after his discharge has procured
his arrest again on an order in a civil action for fraud,
where an arrest was not warranted, he procures from that per-
son, while he is imprisoned, after several months' confinement,
and on the promise to obtain bail for him, which is done, a
release of himself, and the sureties on the bond given for the
order of arrest, the release is given under duress, and will not
bar an action on the bond to recover damages for the impris-
-onment: Lazzarone v. Oishei, 21 N. Y. Suppl. 267. But an
arrest and imprisonment on lawful process, used in a proper
manner, and only for a lawful purpose, is valid, and-cannot be
-construed as duress: . Nealley v. Greenougl, 25 N. H. 325;
.Eddy v. Herrin, 17 Me. 338; even though no cause of action
really existed, if the prosecution was instituted bona fide and
.upon probable cause: Prichard v. Shar, 51 Mich. 432; Clark
v.- Turnbull, 47 N. J. L. 265. A note or other security given
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to release the defendant in such a case from prison, may be
void as given to compound a felony; but it cannot be awarded
on the ground of duress.
If, however, the arrest and imprisonment are merely for the
purpose of enforcing a civil liability, such is an improper use
of criminal process, and a security obtained under such circum-
stances cannot stand: Seiber v. Price, 26 Mich. 518 ; P1elps
v. Zuschlag, 34 Tex. 371. "A contract obtained by duress
of unlawful imprisonment is voidable, and if the imprisonment
is under legal process in regular form, it is nevertheless unlaw-
ful as against one who procured it improperly, for the purpose
of obtaining the execution of a contract, and a contract obtained
by means of it is voidable for duress:" Morse v. Woodwonk,
155 Mass. 233; S. C., 29 N. E. Rep. 525.
IV. Duress per minas is the most fruitful branch of this
theme; and its varieties are endless. It has been most excel-
lently defined and explained in a lengthy opinion by Knowlton,
J., in Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233 ; S. C., 29 N. E.
Rep. 525, already cited, which is well worth quoting more at
length:
"The rule as to duress per minas has now a broader appli-
cation than formerly. It is founded on the principle that a
contract rests on the free and voluntarv action of the minds of
the parties, meeting in an agreement which is to be binding
upon them. If an influence is exerted on one of them of such
a kind as to overcome his will and compel a formal assent to
an undertaking when he does not really agree to it, and so to
make that appear to be his act which is not his but another's,
imposed on him through fear which depriVes him of self-
control, there is no contract, unless the other deals with him
in good faith, in ignorance of the improper influence, and in
the belief that he is acting voluntarily.
-To set aside a contract for duress it must be shown, first,
that the will of one of the parties was overcome, and that he
was thus subjected to the power of another, and that the means
used to induce him to act were of such a kind as would over-
come the mind and will of an ordinary person. It has often
.been held, that threats of civil suits and of ordinary proceed-
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ings against property are not enough, because ordinary persons,
do not cease to act voluntarily on account of such threats.
But threats of imprisonment may be so violent and forceful as
to have that effect. It must also be shown, that the other
party to the contract is not, through ignorance of the duress
or for any other reason, in a position which entitles him to
take advantage of a contract made under constraint without-
voluntary assent to it. If he knows that means have been
used to overcome the will of him with whom he is dealing, so
that he is to obtain a formal agreement to it which is not a real
agreement it is against equity and good conscience for him to
become a part, to the contract, and it is unlawful for him to
attempt to gain a benefit from such an influence improperly-
exerted."
In the first place, then, the threat relied upon to constitute.
duress mast be such as to control the mind and will of the-
party affected, and prevent his acting as a free agent.
Whether or not a given threat is of such a nature depends-
wholly upon circumstances ; but the general rule is, that the
threats must be such as would naturally excite fear in a person
of ordinary courage, and that that fear must be grounded on
a reasonable belief that the person threatening has at hand
the means to carry his threat into present execution ; Youngs"
v. Simon. 41 Ill. App. 28. In other words, mere bluster can-
not constitute duress ; and the man who permits himself to-
be frightened by empty words, cannot set up his cowardice as
a sufficient excuse to release him from the performance of his
promise: See Bosley v. Shannon, 26 Ark. 28o; Wells v.
Shtder, 7o N. C. 55. " To constitute the coercion or duress,
which will be regarded as sufficient to make a payment in-
voluntary, . . . there must be some control or threatened'
exercise of power possessed or believed to be possessed by-
the party exacting or receiving the payment, over the person.
or property of another, from which the latter has no other
means of immediate relief than by making the payment:"
Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U. S. 21o. Therefore, if the person,
who makes the threats, is not, and is not represented to be,
in a position to carry out his threats, and has no means of'
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executing them other than such as are possessed by all mem-
bers of the community; when the liberty of the person'
threatened is in no wise restrained, and the threatener has
made no complaint, has no warrant, and is not represented to
have, nor, in fact, has, or appears to have at hand or within
control, any means for carrying into execution his announced
purpose, mere, threats of arrest do not constitute duress:
Youngs v. Simon, 41 Ill. App. 28. Accordingly, threats of
loss of life, or bodily injury, made by one who is in a position
to execute his threat, will constitute duress: Brown v. Pierce,
.7 Wall. 205 ; Baker v. Morton, 12 Wall. 150; and the deed
of one who was pulled from his bed at night by a crowd of
men, dragged into the street, and compelled to go to the
office of a justice of the peace and there execute the instru-
ment in question, may be avoided: Brown v. Peck, 2 Wis.
26 1. So, the threat of 'a husband to separate from his wife,
if she have reasonable cause to apprehend that he will put it
into execution: Tapley v. Tapley, IO Minn. 448; or violent
behavior toward and cruel treatment of the wife: Goodrich v.
Cushman, 34 Neb. 46o; amount to duress. A security
obtained by a threat of immediate arrest and imprisonment is
made under duress: Bush v. Brown, 49 Ind. 573; Morrison
v. Faulkner, 8o Tex. 128; Obert v. Landa, 5 Tex. Civ. App.
620; S. C., 25 S. W. Rep. 342; and it may still be duress,
though the amount for which the note is given is actually due
from the maker to the payee: Taylor v. Jaques, io6 Mass.
291 * If one pays an illegal tax to prevent the issuing of a
threatened warrant of distress, which must issue of course,
unless the tax is paid, he can recover it: Preston v. Boston, 12
Pick. 7; Gim v. Weissenburg School District, 57 Pa. 433.
But a mere indefinite threat of criminal prosecution, or one
made when neither the warrant had issued nor the proceed-
ings had been commenced, is no duress: i-ggins v. Brown,
(Me.), 5 Atl. Rep. 267; Harmon v. Harmon, 61 Me. 227;
Knapp v. Hyde, 6o Barb., (N. Y.), 8o; especially if the person
threatened knows that the one who makes the threats has no
present means of carrying them into execution, by actually
taking him into custody, and has, in his knowledge, the power
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and opportunity to mrake a defence to such threatened prose-
cution: Hrton v. Bloedorn, 57 Neb. 666; S. C., 56 N. W.
Rep. 321. The mere threat of injury to property, without
the power to execute the threat, is not duress: Miller v.
Mfiller, 68 Pa. 486.
The reasonableness of the belief of the party claiming
duress in the imminence of the threatened danger, is dependent
to a very large extent upon circumstances; and is always a
question for the jury. When the defendant had threatened to
have the plaintiff imprisoned, and to deprive him of his prop-
erty, because of certain testimony given by the plaintiff
derogatory to defendant, though the testimony was, in fact,
privileged, which the plaintiff, who was a weak, ignorant
man, did not know; and the defendant was a keen business
man, and known to the plaintiff to be a man of determination;
a sum of money procured from the plaintiff by such threat
was held to have been procured under duress: Baldwin v.
Hutchinson, (Ind.), 35 N. E. Rep. 711. Similarly, when the
plaintiff, a man 7 years old, ignorant of the law, was threat-
ened by the defendant with prosecution, imprisonment and a
fine of $5oo for selling cider without a license, unless he
would pay the defendant $i5o, the defendant claiming to
have great knowledge of the law; and the plaintiff was con-
fronted with several men, who claimed that he had sold them
cider, and was informed by the defendant that the men would
so testify on the prosecution ; the payment by the plaintiff,
under these circumstances, of the sum demanded, was held to
have been made under duress, and void, the jury having so
found: Crilbs v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 340; S. C., 49 N. W.
Rep. 587.
It has been claimed that the threat of an illegal prosecu-
tion is not duress, because the person threatened has really
nothing to fear therefrom, and besides, it is his duty to resist a
false accusation: Buchanan v. Sahlin, 9 Mo. App. 552; see
Horton v. Bloedorn, 57"Neb. 666; S. C., 56 N. W. Rep. 321.
It was held, however, in Bane v. Detrick, 52 Il. 19, that
chough the arrest would be illegal, yet if the threats were such
as would terrify a man of ordinary and reasonable firmness,
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-they would constitute duress. It is difficult to treat such de-
cisions seriously. The mere danger of imprisonment is not
the thing to be feared. in the case of an innocent man; it is the
loss of reputation that inevitably follows on a criminal prose-
cution, no matter how innocent the accused may be, and how-
-ever triumphant his acquittal; the annoyance and grief caused
his friends and relatives; and the expense of defending him-
self, with the troubles and worry that the very fact of such an
accusation, with its results, will cause any but the most de-
praved to feel. It is safe to say that nine, men out of ten
who would defy the chance of being sent to jail under such
-circumstances, would nevertheless, in view of these other con-
sequences, seek to stifle the accuser, and submit to his de-
mands, rather than run the gauntlet of public criticism under
such auspices. The contrary rule, that a contract procured
by threat of illegal arrest is obtained under duress, is the only
true doctrine. See Ligilhall v. Moore, 2 Colo. App. 354;
S. C., 31 Pac. Rep. 511.
The threats used must also be such as, if executed, would
-work a substantial injury to the person threatened; and not,
be a mere declaration of an intention to assert a legal right.
A threat of a civil suit, therefore, is in general no ground for
a claim of duress: Jkfascolo v. Zk/ontesanto, 61 Conn. 5o; S. C.,
23 Atl. Rep. 714; Pecklnam v. Hendren, 76 Ill. 47; Dausclt v.
Crane, 109 Mo. 323; Pryor v. Hunter, 31 Neb. 678; McCor-
wick v. Volsack, (S. Dak.), 55 N. W. Rep. 145 ; nor is a threat
to lei1y a lawful execution: Wilcox v. Howland, 23 Pick. 167.
It is not unlawfnl for a creditor to demand and obtain from
his debtor a security for a bona fide debt, undier a threat of suit
if the security be not given; and the debtor cannot avoid pay-
ment of the security merely on the ground that it was
obtained by means of such a threat: .McClair v. Wilson, 18
Colo. 82; S. C., 31 Pac. Rep. 502. But a threat to use oppres-
sive civil process may be equivalent to duress; as, for instance,
where a materialman threatened to file a mechanics' lien on a
house, unless the owner, who had overpaid the contractor,
would pay an indebtedness of the contractor to the material-
man for material, alleged to have been used in the house,
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representing at the same time to the owner that the filing of-
the lien would, in the then condition of his affairs, seriously
embarrass him, and thereupon furnished a fraudulent statement
of the alleged indebtedness, including items furnished to the
contractor for use on other buildings: Gates v. Dundore, 18
N.Y. Suppl. 149. See Foerster v. Squier, 19 N. Y. Suppl. 367.
There is some difference of opinion as to whether a threat
of lawful imprisonment, made to a person who has violated
the criminal laws, can be called duress : Bodine v. Morgan,
37 N. J. Eq. 426. It has been held that a promissory note,
,aken in payment of money embezzled, is not necessarily
voidable because obtained on threats of criminal prosecution,
as there is ; good consideration for it, viz., the money embez-
zled: Hilborn v. Biuckman, 78 Me. 482 ; S. C., 7 Atl. Rep.
272; Thorn v. Pinkhiam, (Me.), 24 Atl. Rep. 718. But
it has also been held that written securities extorted
by threats of prosecution for a criminal offence of which the
party is, in fact, guilty, but which are in no manner connected
with the demand for which compensation is sought, may be
avoided by the persons executing them: Thompson v. Niggley,
(Kat.), 35 Pac. Rep. 290. The true rule seems to be, that
when the threat is made merely to enforce the execution of
the contract, and to compel the person accused to a settle-
ment, it will be duress ; otherwise not. To quote again fiom
Judge Knowlton: "The question is, whether the threat is of
imprisonment, which will be unlawful in reference to the con-
duct of the threhtener, who is seeking to obtain a contract by
his threat. Imprisonment that is sufficient through the
execution of a threat, which was made for the purpose of
forcing a guilty person to enter into a contract, may be lawful
as against the authorities and the public, but unlawful as
against the threatener, when considered in reference to his
effort to use for his private benefit processes provided for the
protection of the public and the punishment of crime. One
who has overcome the mind and will of another for his own
advantage, under such circumstances, is guilty of a perver-
sion and abuse of laws, which were made for another pur-
pose, and 'he is in no position to claim the advantage of a
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formal contract obtained in that way, on the ground that the
rights of the parties are to be determined by their language
and their overt acts, without reference to the influences which
moved them. In such a case, there is no reason why one
should be bound by a contract obtaincd by force, which in
reality is not-his, but another's. . . . We do not intimate that
a note given in consideration of money embezzled from the
payee can be avoided on the ground of duress, merely because
the fear of arrest and imprisonment, if he failed to pay, was
one of the inducements to the embezzler to make the note.
'But, if the fact that he is liable to arrest and imprisonment, is
used as a threat to overcome his will and compel a settle-
ment, which he would not have made voluntarily, the case is
different. The question in every such case is, whether his
liability to imprisonment was used against him, by way of a
threat, to force a settlement. If so, the use was improper and
unlawful, and, if the threats were such as would naturally
overcome the mind and will of an ordinary man, and if
they overcame his, he may avoid the settlement:" Morse v.
Woodwortlt, 155 Mass. 233 ; S. C., 29 N. E. Rep. 525.
In the second place, the threats must be shown to have
,emanated from, or at least to have been made with the knowl-
edge of the person who is to be benefited by the transaction:
McClatchie v. Haslam, 63 L. T. N. S. 376. False representa-
tions of third parties, not instigated by the creditor, are no
ground for proving duress: Fulton v. Hood, 34 Pa. 365. Rep-
resentations made to a wife by her brother and husband that
the latter is in danger of criminal prosecution by a bank, but
made without the knowledge or authority of the bank, are
not duress: Compton v. Bunker Hill Bank, 96 Ill. 301; see
Central Bank of Frederick v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305; nor are
such representations, -when made by the husband alone:
Mundy v. WHtittentore, 15 Neb. 647; S. C., 19 N. W. Rep.
694. But even if the threats emanate from the creditor, the
fact that friends advise the debtor in good faith to make a set-
tlement, will not constitute duress, although he knows of the
-threats: Phillips v. Henry, i6o Pa. 24; S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 477.
In the third place, it is not necessary that the threats be of
a prosecution of the party in whose favor duress is claimed.
The protection of the doctrine extends to all those who,
occupy a relation to the person threatened which renders them
subject to be so affected by his danger as to be no longer free
agents. Thus, a father may be subjected to duress by a threat
to imprison his son, and thig whether the charge be true or
false: Williams v. Bayley, i L. R. H. L. 200; affirming Bayley
v. Williams, 4 Giff. 638 ; Small v. Williams, 87 Ga. 681 ; S. C.,
13 S. E. Rep. 589; Harris v. Cannody, 131 Mass. 51;.
Bryant v. Peck & Whiffle Co., i54 Mass. 46o; S. C., 28 N.
E. Rep. 678; Western Ave. Bldg. Assn. v. Walters, 7 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 202; Natl. Bk. of Oxford v. Kirk, 9 Pa. 49; Coff-
man v. Lookout Bank, 5 Lea, (Tenn.), 232; Schultz v. Cul-
bertson, .49 Wis. 122; S. C., 4 N. W. Rep. IO7O; a mother
may be put in duress by a threat against her child: So. Erp.
Co. v. Duffy, 48 Ga. 358; Meeck v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274; S. C.,
46 N..W. Rep. 383; Met. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Meeker,
85 N. Y. 614; Sclwener v. Lissaner, 107 N.Y. I I; S. C., 13
N. E. Rep. 741 ; Jordan v. Elliott, 12 W. N. C. 56; Foley v.
Greene, 14 R. I. 618; or a child, by threats to prosecute his
parent: Adams v. Irdng Nati. Bk. of N. Y., i 16 N. Y. 6o6;
S. C., 23 N. E. Rep. 7. So, also, a threat of prosecution of
the husband will be duress sufficient, in a proper case, to avoid
the contract of the wife made to prevent such prosecution:
McClatchie v. Haslam, 63 L. T. N. S. 376; First Natl. Bk. of
Nevada v. Bryan, 62 Iowa, 42; S. C., 17 N. W. Rep. I65;
Winfield Natl. Bk. v. Croco, 46 Kans. 620; Central Bk. of
Frederick v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305; Mfiller v. Union Lumber
Co., 98 Mich. 163; S. C., 57 N. W. Rep. ioi; Eadie v. Slim-
mons, 26 N. Y. 9; City Nat. Bk. of Dayton v. Kusworm,
(the principal case), (Wis.), 59 N. W. Rep. 564. The same is
true of a sister, whose brother is threatened, even though the
threats were not made directly to her, if they were intended
to be communicated to her, and were in fact so communi-
cated. Schultz v. Catlin, 78 Wis. 611; of a grandparent, in
the case oT a grandson, who is also an adopted child, and for
whom she has great affection: Bradley v. Irish, 42 Ill. App.
85; of an aunt, in the case of a nephew, to whom she is
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greatly attached: Sharon v. Gager, 46 Conn. i89; and of a
woman, whose betrothed is threatened on the eve of the mar-
riage; Rau v. VonZedlit, 132 Mass. 164. It may be safely
affirmed that this rule extends to all the domestic relations.
In any case, it is not necessary that the threats be contempo-
raneous with the making of the contract; in fact, in the case
of transmitted threats, it is impossible that such should be the
case-. It is, therefore, sufficient, if the threats be the induce-
ment of the contract; and, the fact that they were made a few
days before its e kecution will not prevent it from being
'avoided on the ground of duress, if they have not been
retracted, (to the knowledge of the person giving the security),
during the intervening time: Taylor v. Jaques, lo6 Mass. 291.
V. The rule as to duress of goods, similar to 'that laid
down in the case of duress by imprisonment, is, that any con-
tract, obtained by one in possession of the goods of another,
through an illegal retention of the goods until his demands
are complied with, may be avoided by the owner of the
goods; and the same is true where the goods are lawfully
retained, but with an illegal intent. " Duress of goods may
exist when one is compelled to submit to an illegal exaction,
in order to obtain them from one who has them in possession,
but refuses to surrender them, unless the exaction is sub-
mitted to :" Hackley v. Headley, (Mich.), 8 N. W. Rep. 51 .
The refusal to allow the redemption of a pledge, except upon
payment of an illegal claim, falls under this rule: Astley v.
Reynolds, 2 Str. 915; Stenton v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480; as
does the refusal of a carrier to deliver proper.ty to a consignee,
without the payment of an illegal charge: Ashmole v. Wain-
wrizht, 2 Q. B. 837; Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99:
Baldwin v. Liverpool & Gt. West. S. S. Co., Ltd., 74 N. Y
125; the detention of a raft of lumber, in order to extort
illegal toll: Chase v. Dwinal, 7 Me. 134; and, in short, an-
refusal to deliver property to its owner until a disputed claim
is paid, if the claim appear afterwards to have been unwar-
ranted: Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 B. & C., 73 ; Scholey v. Mium.
ford, 6o N. Y. 498; White v. feyhnan, 34 Pa. 142. So, a
unlawful refusal to clear a vessel until, certain claims are paic
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will be duress : A&cPherson v. Cox, 86 N. Y. 472; Baldwin v.
Sudlivan Timber Co., 2o N. Y. Suppi. 496; and when the
plaintiff contracted to buy certain cattle and paid $x75,50 0 ,
leaving a balance of $27,0oo due, and discovered, before pay-
ing that balance, that property to the value of $I4,I 10, cov-
ered by the contract of sale, had been delivered to other
parties, but could not get possession of any part of the pur-
chase without completing the stipulated payment; and unless
he took possession, the property would be at great risk of
loss for want of care during the winter just beginning; it was
held that the payment of the balance under -protest was
extorted by duress, and that the plaintiff could maintain a suit
to recover the value of the property wrongfully delivered to
others: Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U. S. 581; S. C., 13 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 684; affirming Buford v. Lonergan, 22 Pac. Rep. 164.
The property, however, must be that in which the owner
has an existing right of possession; a mere refusal to pay a
debt: Doyle v. Rector, 133 N. Y. 3 7 2; Miller v. Miller, 68
Ia. 486; or a threat to withhold payment of a debt already
cue: Cable v. Foley, (Minn.), 47 N. W. Rep. 1035; is not
duress. In XcCormick v. Dalton, (Kans.), 35 Pac. Rep: I 113,
'D. had a parol contract with M. to grade a mile of roadbed
'br a railroad at a stated price per cubic yard, and M., desiring
to abrogate the verbal contract, demanded of D. the signing
of a written contract for half a mile only of the heaviest part
of the grading, at the same price per cubic yard, and upon his
refusing to sign, because the written contract did not corre-
spond with the verbal one, M. said to the men working for
him: " I will stand good for no more work you do for D.,
and D. can stop at once." D., because of his financial con-
dition, was unable to carry on the work, unless M. paid the
men, and after studying over the matter for a few days, signed
the contract. On these facts, it was held that the contract
could not be said to have been signed by D. under duress.
But it comes at least very near the border line.
Similarly, a threat by a lessor to eject a tenant at will,
unless he will pay a sum demanded as rent, is not such duress
as will entitle the tenant to recover the rent so paid, though
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more is demanded than is actually due, and the tenant pays it
under protest: Emions v. Scudder,, 115 Mass. '367 ; and the
demand by a labor union of a certain sum, for supplying
journeymen to a baker whose men have deserted him, is not
duress, especially when the charge made is a usual one,
Grabooski v. Gewerz, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 528.
VI. A contract extorted by duress is not void, but voidable
only ; and the right to rescind, it, or to recover payments made
under it, may be lost by laches, acquiescence- or ratification:
Foerster v. Squier, 19 N. Y. Suppl. 367. A delay of seven
-years in asserting duress will render necessary the presentation
of a very strong case, in order to authorize the interference of
a court of equity : Davis v. Fore, 59 N. W. Rep. 125. Acqui-
escence may be presumed after the lapse of three years:
Gregor v. Hyde, (C. C. A.), 62 Fed. Rep. 107. When a deed
is extorted from a grantor, under the pressure of a threat of
prosecution for larceny, and possession is given under the deed,
but no steps are taken to avoid it until the prosecution is
barred, it is a ratification : Eberstein v. Willets, 134 Ill. 101.
And when a deed is executed in consequence of threats of
criminal prosecution against the grantor's husband, and the
grantor, with full knowledge of its invalidity, and of the fact
that her husband has escaped to a foreign country, and is
beyond the reach of criminal process, voluntarily executes
another deed to the grantees, to induce them to purchase
a lot of household furniture on the premises, the former
deed is ratified: Millerv. Ainor Lumber Co., (Mich.), 57 N. W.
Rep. lOI.
VII. The validity of a contract made under duress may be
attacked either directly, by bill in equity for relief, or by way
of defense to a suit thereon. In either case, the fact that the
contract was executed, or payment made, with full knowledge
of all the facts, will not estop the person injured from alleging
the duress: Buford v. Lonergan, 22 Pac. Rep. 164; affirmed
in Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U. S. 581 ; S. C., 13 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 684; nor will he be estopped by the fact that the
evidences of the crime were delivered on the execution of the
contract, and have since been destroyed by him: City Natl.
57
DURESS
Bk. of Dayton v. Knsworm, (the principal case), (Wis.), 59
N. W. Rep. 564- On a bill for relief, the fact that the con-
sideration was illegal, being to compound a felony, will not
prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the relief sought: Bryant
v. Peck & Whiffle Co., (Mass.), 28 N. E. Rep. 678. In a suit
on a contract, the fact that the plea or answer does not for-
mally set up the defence of duress -will not prevent that
defence, if found in the evidence, from availing to defeat
recovery : Morrill v. Nightingale, 93 Cal. 452 ; S. C., 28 Pac.
Rep. io6S ; especially if the evidence thereof has been admitted
without objection: First Natl. Bk. of Nevada v. Bryan, 62
iowa, 42; S. C., 17 N. W. Rep. 165. A contract obtained
-by duress is void in the hands of a holder with notice: Thomp-
son v. Nigg'ley, (Kans.), 35 Pac. Rep. 290; Brown v. Peck, 2
Wis. 261 ; but when a debtor has assigned a claim to a credi-
tor to pay a just debt, his assignee for the benefit of creditors
cannot, without his authority, claim that that assignment was
made by duress, probably on the ground that the duress,
being a tort, is a personal claim of the debtor, and does not
pass by the assignment: Phillips v. Henry, 16o Pa. 24; S. C.,
28 Atl. Rep. 477. . X.
[The above does not profess to be an exhaustive collection
of the cases on the subject of duress. To collate the authori-
ties upon that subject, would be, as was said by Judge Gray,
in Youngs v. Simon, 41 111. App. 28, "an almost endless task."
The aim of the writer has been simply to present the outline
of the subject, with especial reference to the more recent cases.
The older ones will be found' collected in 6 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. of Law, 64 et seq.].
